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On November 4, 1952, Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower became the 34th 
President of the United States with a landslide, thus ending the Democratic 
Party twenty years occupancy of the White House. He also carried his Party 
to a narrow control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. His 
success, not the Party’s, was repeated in 1956. Even more impressive than 
Eisenhower’s two landslide victories was his ability to protect and maintain his 
popularity among the American people throughout the eight years of his 
presidency. When he left the White House in January 1961, his approval 
rating was 65 per cent (Gallup Polls, 2016). His rhetoric played an important 
role in preserving this popularity. Indeed, it was one of the tools he most 
frequently used to retain flexibility and manoeuvrability. These in turn allowed 
him to implement what he believed were the right policies without 
compromising his standing among the American people. Yet, his rhetorical 
and oratorical skills are still poorly understood today. 
The historiography has sufficiently discredited the orthodox school of thought 
of the 1950s and 1960s that mocked this President for his verbal ambiguities 
and lacklustre style. (Barber, 1972). Eisenhower’s staff accounts and 
revisionist historians, such as Stephen Ambrose (1984) and Fred Greenstein 
(1982) have clearly shown that Ike intentionally projected a friendly image and 
muddles grammar to divert unwanted attention to some of his policies and 
retain freedom to choose his options. Among the scholars of this period, the 
one who certainly offered the most ground-breaking assessment of 
Eisenhower’s rhetoric is political scientist Martin Medhurst (1993). Medhurst 
argues that the President successfully used his rhetoric as a weapon to wage 
the Cold War. He used it especially during crises to effect change or 
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modification in the existing situation and to influence the beliefs, attitudes and 
actions of both domestic and foreign audiences. In his view, Eisenhower was 
a master of rhetoric. 
In the last twenty years, a post revisionist wave of literature has tried to strike 
a balance between these two extreme schools of thought. Scholars like Ira 
Chernus (2003) and Chris Tudda (2006) acknowledge that the President was 
often, not always, an effective speaker. But his rhetorical strategy, however 
skilfully implemented, created a paradox. As Eisenhower claimed he wanted 
peace, he needed to wage war “rhetorically” in order to maintain national unity 
and support for his foreign policy. By doing so, he exacerbated the already 
hostile public feelings towards the enemy, made the USSR more insecure and 
thus peace more difficult to achieve. 
This chapter agrees with the post-revisionist school of thought. Eisenhower 
deserves more credit for his rhetorical skills than previously acknowledged, 
but on the other hand, his communication strategies were not always 
effective. The chapter also argues that thus far scholars have predominantly 
focused on the Cold War discourse. Analyses have looked at how the 
international context affected Eisenhower’s rhetorical content and how, in 
turn, the President tried to influence domestic and foreign audiences through 
his words. But, although it is almost impossible to separate rhetorical content 
from how it is said, the literature still lacks an adequate understanding of 
Eisenhower’s oratorical choices. By looking at Eisenhower’s major speeches 
from 1945 to 1960, this chapter aims at filling this gap. In particular, it will 
focus on four research questions: 
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1) How did Eisenhower’s oratory and rhetoric include Aristotle’s primary 
modes of persuasive appeal: ethos, pathos and logos? 
2) What did he want to achieve through his oratory and rhetoric? 
3) How did he exploit the rising power of the media, especially TV? 
4) What characterised his oratory and delivery? 
 
EISENHOWER’S ETHOS & PATHOS 
Aristotle (1991) argued that an effective orator must generate credibility with 
their audience through their ethos by showing their personal characteristics 
and experience. He also believed that pathos, the ability to evoke an 
emotional connection with the audience, was the most powerful persuasive 
tool (Leith, 2011:47). 
Eisenhower’s ethos was already firmly established well before he entered the 
political arena. As Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, 
he became an international hero by defeating Hitler and the Nazi regime. 
Through the media reports of the conflict, he connected with millions of 
Americans who came to know the General not only as a strong military man, 
but also as a far-sighted and determined leader. Between 1944 and 1945, 
they heard his firm but compassionate voice reassuring them over the 
progress of the war in many radio recorded programmes. His friendly smile 
appeared in several newsreels produced by the US Army Pictorial Service 
and distributed in movie theatres across the United States. By the time he 
returned to the US in June 1945, Time magazine had already dedicated him 
four covers, including Man of the Year in January 1945. (Time, 1945). 
 5 
His triumphant return was welcomed by huge crowds and celebrations all over 
the United States. In Washington DC, he was invited to address a joint 
session of Congress. During the speech, the first of many, Eisenhower spoke 
extemporaneously of the courageous men and women who had fought for 
freedom and peace, two themes which would become a staple of his rhetoric 
during his political career. Declaring: 
 
“In humble realisation that they, who earned your commendation, should 
properly be here to receive it, I am nevertheless proud and honoured to 
serve as your agent in conveying it to them.” (Eisenhower, 1945). 
 
He won his audience over by showing humility and praising soldiers, officials, 
allies and the American effort at home. According to a reporter covering the 
event, the General received a “tremendous ovation, everyone is standing up 
on their feet” and the largest applause for anyone who has ever addressed 
Congress (Eisenhower’s Address to Congress, 1945). 
The following day, he flew to New York where thousands of people, from 
LaGuardia airport to Washington Square, lined the parade route to welcome 
Ike. NBC reported that Eisenhower’s homecoming was the most widely 
publicised event since Lindbergh came back from Paris. There were more 
than two million people outside City Hall, where he was made honorary citizen 
of New York City. (Eisenhower Day Ceremony, 1945). Though tired, the 
General never seemed to lose his famous grin. On June 22, his hometown of 
Abilene, Kansas, held an old fashion, non-military parade featuring scenes of 
the Abilene Eisenhower had known when he was a boy. One sign read: 
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“Welcome to our hero!” (Kansas Historical Quarterly, 1945). But in addressing 
the crowd, Eisenhower declared: 
 
“I am not a hero, I am the symbol of heroic men….it has been my great 
honour to command three millions Americans and women in Europe.” 
(Eisenhower, 1945) 
 
For the next three years and half, Eisenhower delivered more than 124 
formal speeches. The public loved him and invitations poured from every 
corner of the country. The image that these speeches created was one of a 
humble man who talked more like a soldier than an officer. As he told an 
audience at Norwich University in Vermont, on June 9, 1946: 
 
“I am here in the name of millions of Allied fighting men, authors of 
memorable victories in the Mediterranean and in Western Europe. I will 
never be able to express the greatness of my pride in their 
accomplishments. So I am unable to make them, or you, understand the 
depth of my humility when a great institution such as this calls me to act 
as their representative to receive tribute to their soldierly virtues.” 
(Eisenhower, 1946). 
 
He often spoke of the importance of teamwork: 
 
“Many accomplishments in these two past years can be attributed not to 
anyone nation or man, but to the fact the all of us had our sights trained 
on a definite goal and we pulled together as a team.” (Eisenhower, 1945). 
 7 
 
Though he had seen the horrors of war first hand, his message was one of 
optimism: “courage, devotion, drive, sacrifice, discipline, mutual help, loyalty” 
(Eisenhower, 1946) these were the values Ike projected and was associated 
with. 
As argued by Medhurst (1993:5-16), this image was reinforced by the 
publication of three best-selling books. In 1945, Kenneth S. Davis wrote the 
first full-length biography of Eisenhower, Soldier of Democracy (1945). The 
book painted a picture of Eisenhower as a humble man, dedicated to service 
and duty and devoted to the protection of democracy. Just one year after, 
Harry Butcher, Eisenhower’s Naval Aide from 1942 to 1945, published his 
memoir, My Three Years with Eisenhower (1946). In his portray, the General 
emerged as a man very considerate of other people’s opinions and feelings 
but also a brave strategist and leader. Similarly, Eisenhower’s own memoir, 
Crusade in Europe (1948), reinforced what a compassionate but also 
courageous and astute decision maker he was. As Ambrose (1984:237) 
wrote the book was greeted with “almost unanimous critical acclaim and 
praise for its author’s modesty, candor, fairness, tact and general humanity.” 
The following year, the book spun off into a TV series. Aired by ABC, it was 
the first documentary produced for the TV. Many of the 126 episodes 
featured on-camera and narrated segments that Eisenhower recorded. It 
received a Peabody Award and one of the first Emmy Awards for best Public 
Service, Cultural and Educational programme. (Allen, 1993:16; Internet 
Movie Database, 2016). 
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In 1948, Eisenhower became the President of Columbia University and a few 
years later, he was appointed as the first NATO Supreme Commander. 
These prestigious appointments combined with his successful military 
records showed the American people that Ike could lead in many diverse 
fields, from military command to education, from administration to diplomacy 
(Medhurst, 1993:18). They also perfectly positioned him as the ideal 
candidate for the 1952 Presidential election. 
Whether he wanted the job or not has been the subject of debate among 
historians. Regardless, it is true that both parties wanted him because both 
knew he could win. According to Ambrose (1982:228), in 1947 President 
Truman told Ike that he would run as his vice-presidential nominee, if the 
General joined the Democratic Party. 1948 Republican candidate, Tom 
Dewey told Milton Eisenhower, that the General’s popularity among the 
American people was so great that “he was a public possession.” 
(Halberstam, 1993:209). On June 23, 1952, Ike announced he would run for 
President as a Republican. 
After easily securing the nomination, Eisenhower fought one of the most 
brutal campaigns of the twenty-century. The campaign drew entirely on his 
ethos and his ability to connect with voters through his warm smiles, plain 
talk and heroic image. It was the last whistle stop campaign. He travelled 
forty-five states with his special train nicknamed “Look Ahead, Neighbor!”. It 
was the first media campaign. Citizens for Eisenhower designed and paid for 
a series of one-minute television ads entitled “Eisenhower Answers America.” 
In each ad, one citizen would ask the General a question either about 
economy, social security or the Korean War. Behind every answer lay 
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Eisenhower’s ethos. In brief and simple messages, he pitted his expertise, 
experience and character against the corrupted and incompetent policies of 
the Truman administration. Another ad was entitled “The Man from Abilene” 
and told the story of Eisenhower’s humble beginnings in Kansas to his victory 
in Europe. In other words, it portrayed the General as the embodiment of the 
American Dream. The most popular ad was the “I like Ike” ad, which turned 
the catching phrase into part of the American political language. (The Living 
Room Candidate, 2016 & Wood, 1990). 
The high point of this campaign came on October 24, 1952 in Detroit, when 
the General announced: “I shall go to Korea!”. The success of the speech 
hinged entirely on Eisenhower’s ethos and pathos. He captured the nation’s 
feelings by declaring: 
 
“In this anxious autumn for America, one fact looms above all others in 
our people’s minds. One tragedy challenges all men dedicated to the work 
of peace. One word shouts denial to those who foolishly pretend that ours 
is not a nation at war. This fact, this tragedy, this word is: Korea.” 
(Eisenhower, 1952) 
 
He then drew on his experience to tell the American people that if elected, 
what he had done during World War II could be successfully repeated 
(Medhurst, 2000). 
 
“I know something of this totalitarian mind. Through the years of World 
War II, I carried a heavy burden of decision into the free world’s crusade 
against tyranny then threatening us all. Month after month, year after year, 
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I had to search out and weight the strengths and the weaknesses of an 
enemy driven by lust to rule the great globe itself.” (Eisenhower, 1952) 
 
The result was a landslide victory. 
 
EISENHOWER, SPEECHMAKING & SPEECHWRITERS 
Preserving this image of a humble war hero dedicated to service became one 
of Eisenhower’s priorities once he entered the White House in January 1953. 
Rhetoric and oratory were the two main tools he used to succeed. 
Eisenhower had no use for mere talks. All rhetorical flourishes made him 
uneasy (Hughes, 1963:25). Indeed, speeches and addresses had to be 
purposive. As one of his speechwriters, William Bragg Ewald Jr (1977), 
noted: “Eisenhower used language to accomplish his purposes, and if such 
purposes required indirection, suggestions, nuance generalities or intended 
ambiguity, that was what he would use.” In other words for Eisenhower, 
rhetoric and oratory existed only to achieve particular goals with specific 
audiences. His four main goals were: 
 
1) Maintaining his popularity among the American people 
2) Protecting himself from media attacks 
3) Uniting the Republican party but at the same time retaining 
manoeuvrability from Congress 
4) Regaining the initiative in the Cold War 
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Considering his role as chief of state as a symbol of national unity, 
Eisenhower believed that his primary responsibility lay in leading the public. 
As an internal memorandum reveals, “he felt his big job was selling the 
people of America the things that they have for the best of all the people.” 
(Whitman, 1953). To do so, he deemed it essential not to become involved in 
public controversies or to be exposed to personal attacks that could damage 
his credibility and his popularity among the American people, which he had 
so carefully cultivated for the past decade. This consideration shaped his 
relationship with the press and Congress. 
Eisenhower’s Press Secretary, James C. Hagerty (1977), agreed that it was 
essential for Ike to protect his popularity. In order to achieve this, he 
suggested that the Ike “present his case to the public as often as possible” 
through frequent public speaking engagements and regular weekly press 
conferences. In particular, both men were keen on exploiting the new rising 
medium of television. As Eisenhower’s economic adviser, Gabriel Hauge, 
stated in his enthusiastic response to the idea, “television is a medium that 
provides insight, sound, motion, immediate action and creation of great 
intimacy.” (Hauge, 1953). By presenting his message over the head of 
Congress and the press, Ike could establish a direct link with the American 
people and gain some political leverage in the process. As a result a series of 
Eisenhower’s reports to the nation on live television (later called TV fireside 
chats) was created. The news conference format was also expanded by 
allowing direct quotations of the President’s statements. This latter decision, 
especially welcomed by the media, led to the radio recordings and live 
television coverage of the press conference (Oliva, 2017). In historian Craig 
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Allen’s words, “with these moves Eisenhower took a stride toward achieving 
a routine of placing his exact words before the public and having them stand 
alone against potential journalistic distortion or interpretation.” (Allen, 1993: 
54). 
Eisenhower’s press conferences were often subject to press mockery at the 
time and led in great part to the wrongful impression that the President did 
not have a good command of the English language. But Medhurst (1993) and 
Greenstein (1982:25-38), among others, have convincingly shown that 
Eisenhower intentionally used “jumbled syntax” and “long, inappropriate and 
impossibly confusing answers” to defuse controversial questions from 
pressing journalists. When he wanted to make his intentions clear, he 
delegated others like his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles or his Press 
Secretary James C. Hagerty, to serve as “lighting rods” for what were in 
reality his policies. Thanks to this “hidden-hand’ leadership style, he was able 
to retain his credibility both domestically and internationally.  
Direct appeal to the people by using the media also helped Eisenhower 
shield himself from Congress, especially those GOP legislators who had little 
experience of supporting the White House. As he explained to his Cabinet, 
“Congressional Republicans have been so used to a Democratic President 
that their instinct is to automatically oppose anything that comes from the 
executive branch.” (Cabinet Meeting, 1953). Realising instead that a loss of 
one or both Houses in Congress was a strong possibility for the mid-term 
elections of 1954, he decided to protect his image by presenting himself as 
“the President of all the people” (Donovan, 1956:271) and told his staff he 
would not use the Office of the Presidency to campaign for the party. 
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It would be a mistake however to think that he had no interest in rebuilding 
the Republican Party. On the contrary, as director of USIA and Special 
Assistant to the President, Arthur Larson, recalled in his memoir (1968), this 
was one of Eisenhower’s priorities throughout his eight years Presidency. 
The President strongly believed that the future of the party depended on the 
support from the youth. It was necessary to find new young candidates and 
new ideas to replace the conservative right-wing. He used many of his 
speeches to push this agenda forward. The best example is probably his 
1956 Acceptance Speech. Delivered on the 100th anniversary of the GOP 
convention, its message was in a nutshell: “The Republican Party is the Party 
of the Future”. Elaborating on why this was the case, Eisenhower focused 
entirely on appealing to the young voters through optimism and hope.  
 
“It is the Party which concentrates on the facts and the issues of today and 
tomorrow, not the facts and issues of yesterday…the Party of the 
Young…let us quit fighting the battles of the past, and let us turn all our 
attention to these problems of the present future, on which long-term well 
being of our people so urgently depends…The Republican Party is the 
Party of the Future because it draws people together, not drives them 
apart…the Republican Party is the Party of the Future because it is the 
party through which the may things that still need doing will soonest be 
done and will be done by enlisting the fullest energies of free, creative, 
individual people….” (Eisenhower, 1956). 
 
As stated in the introduction, the literature on Eisenhower and rhetoric has 
already extensively covered the foreign policy and Cold War discourses 
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(Medhurst, 1994b). For this reason and because of space limitation, this 
chapter will only look briefly at Eisenhower’s fourth goal: recapturing the Cold 
War initiative. Eisenhower believed that the Cold War was not going to end 
any time soon, instead the US should be prepared for the long haul. For the 
President, the war was first and foremost, a battle of perceptions, beliefs and 
attitudes where rhetoric could be used as a very effective weapon to trigger 
instability and disruption in the enemy but also to persuade those non-aligned 
countries to join the American side. At the same time, he realised that the 
nuclear arms race had turned Armageddon into a reality and that as such war 
had become an impossible alternative. In order to sustain the US effort in the 
face of a prolonged war, recapture the propaganda offensive, weaken the 
Soviet Union and cultivate favourable domestic and international public 
opinion, Eisenhower turned to psychological warfare. With speeches such as a 
“Chance for Peace” (Eisenhower, 1953), “Atoms for Peace” (Eisenhower, 
1953) and the “Open Skies” proposal (Eisenhower, 1955), he coordinated a 
peace offensive that presented the US as the more reasonable party, 
genuinely interested in working towards peace, and the Soviet Union as a 
relentless danger to civilisation and human progress (Schaefermeyer, 1994). 
Eisenhower’s pragmatic and purposive approach to speech making was 
reflected in his speech writing system. Coordinated by the Chief of Staff, 
Sherman Adams, “the calendar committee” consisted of White House 
Appointments Secretary Thomas Stephens, Press Secretary James Hagerty, 
the President’s personal economic advisor, Gabriel Hauge and top aides and 
policy makers who contributed to a particular speech according to their 
expertise and policy interests. For example, Secretary of State, John Foster 
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Dulles, always participated in writing foreign policy addresses and messages 
(Adams, 1962:80). 
Over the eight years of the Eisenhower presidency, they were supported by 
five head speechwriters. Emmet Hughes, a loan from Life/Time magazines 
with a background in foreign policy, unlike the President, he revelled in playing 
with rhetorical devices and idealistic language. Not surprisingly, he co-
authored some of Eisenhower’s most eloquent speeches, such as the two 
Inaugurals and a Chance for Peace. He was succeeded by Bryce Harlow in 
late 1953 who like the President was more pragmatic in his approach to 
speechwriting. Kevin McCann came on board in January 1955. He was a 
personal friend of Eisenhower and more than any other speechwriters he 
understood the President’s personality and ideas. He was replaced by Arthur 
Larson in October 1957. Larson shared Hagerty’s belief that the “President 
was the most effective single educational medium in the country” and 
therefore his image had to be protected and his message spread as of often 
as possible (Larson,1968:159-178). He was very active in expanding the role 
of TV in the White House communication system. Malcolm Moos, professor of 
political science at Johns Hopkins University, became the head speechwriter 
in the autumn of 1958. Eisenhower found him the easiest speechwriter to work 
with because he never tried to impose his views on speech content or form. 
Moos felt his job was simply to put on paper the President’s thoughts. In his 
words: ‘I try to find out what the President wants to say and help him to say in 
the best way.” (Griffin, 2003:76-78). 
Eisenhower valued the benefits of teamwork and having a systemised 
speechwriting operation guaranteed quality results, but he also made sure 
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everybody knew that ultimately he would not give a speech unless he, the 
President, was 100 per cent satisfied with the script. Whether these were 
routine speeches or important occasions, Ike was always involved in the 
writing process. In the case of the former, he did not mind having his staff 
working on a draft first and then edit their work. But for important speeches, he 
would initiate the process himself by instructing Adams to gather the relevant 
information and staff and begin working on a specific issue for a specific 
audience. (Walcott, & Hult, 1994). 
All Eisenhower’s aides agree that regardless of the timing of the President’s 
involvement, when he entered the process, he was quite an aggressive editor 
and would work on the speech right up to its delivery. Speechwriter, William 
Bragg Ewald Jr (1977) noted that his former “boss had been intimately 
involved in drafting speeches and often rewrote them just before delivering 
them.” He was a very meticular editor. Larson corroborated this by writing “He 
worked and revised his manuscripts endlessly. No speech manuscript was 
finished until he arrived to the podium.” (Larson, 1968:160). And Emmet 
Hughes (1963:17-18) recalled in his memoir, that his criticism could range 
from “details of substance to points of style and quality of grammar.” 
When discussing or editing a speech, Eisenhower always followed the same 
criteria. First of all, a speech should only be given if necessary and with an 
objective. Addresses should preferably be short to maximise the effectiveness 
of the message. Rhetorical embellishments should be avoided, instead words 
should be simple and clear to make the speech accessible to as many people 
as possible. Generalizations too should be avoided and any assertion must be 
 17 
accurate. Finally, and most important, the speech had to convey a level of 
dignity appropriate to the Oval Office. (Larson, 1968 & Griffin, 2003). 
It is often questioned whether a speech should be attributed to the orator or 
the person who actually writes the speech. Through this systemised speech 
writing process and aggressive editing, Eisenhower made the speeches his 
own. The final product always reflected the President’s ideas and views. 
 
EISENHOWER’S LOGOS 
Aristotle (1991) described logos as an appeal to reason through the 
identification of the issues at the heart of the debate and “the structure of 
thought these arguments compose.” (Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 2014:7-8). 
Eisenhower’s choice of themes, structure and language for his speeches 
further reinforces the argument that the President had a competent and 
pragmatic understanding of the use of oratory and rhetoric. He identified key 




Eisenhower chose three main themes to convey his message and policies to 
the American people and the world: freedom, peace and strength. These were 
present in all of his major speeches and public addresses throughout the eight 
years of his presidency. All three were broad enough to be easily adapted 
according to the goal of the message and the target audience. 
“The future shall belong to the free” so the new President proclaimed in his 
first Inaugural Address in 1953. His statement reflected his profound belief in 
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the superiority of the American way of life. Only through a free government, 
free market and freedom of belief and worship could a democracy thrive and 
humanity progress. The American people had to fight, and at time sacrifice, to 
preserve these liberties. Eisenhower was especially afraid that the people 
would soon get tired of fighting a long war against the Soviet Union, 
particularly if this involved excessive government spending and high taxation. 
Communism and fiscal instability could eventually lead to war. Public Opinion 
needed to understand what was at stake in order to support the government’s 
policies. To foreign audiences, especially those non-aligned third world 
countries, freedom, the American way, represented something to aspire to 
break away from slavery and old colonial rule. 
For Eisenhower, freedom and peace were indivisible. He spoke of the “golden 
age of freedom and peace” (Chance for Peace, 1953) and of peace “being the 
climate of freedom” (Inaugural 1957). Peace meant first and foremost 
preventing nuclear war. As he declared in his Atoms for Peace Address in 
1953, “the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but 
the very life, of the world,” he understood that in an atomic age total war as 
instrument of policy was unthinkable.  
Freedom and peace could be achieved through strength. Military, economic 
and spiritual strength will unite and protect the country and deter enemies: 
 
“Knowing that only a United States that is strong and immensely 
productive can help defend freedom in our world, we view our Nation’s 
strength and security as a trust upon which rests the hope of the free men 
everywhere.” (Eisenhower, 1953). 
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These themes were linked together by a religious thread that ran through all 
speeches. Eisenhower was not a religious man. As he confessed to a newly 
famous Billy Graham who was visiting him in Paris in 1951, he had never 
been baptised and he and his wife Mamie rarely attended church. But he 
consciously became the figurehead of the 1950s religious revival. His eight 
years presidency was unprecedented in American history for its introduction 
of religious language and symbols into political life (Gunn & Slighoua, 2011). 
Indeed, he began his presidency with a “little private prayer” which he read to 
millions of people listening at the Capitol and watching from home on TV. A 
week after, he was baptised into the Presbyterian Church. He instituted the 
White House Prayer Breakfast (now the National Prayer Breakfast), 
advocated the addition of the words “under God” to the pledge of allegiance 
and helped to raise “In God We Trust” to its status as the nation’s official 
motto. He was not interested in where faith came from or how it worked, but 
he strongly believed it was necessary for the survival of democracy. It was 
only through religious faith that human beings could self-restrain and get 
along thus preventing society from turning into chaos (Holloway, 1994). 
 
Structure 
When addressing the American people or delivering a speech aimed at 
rallying domestic and international support for US policies or at enhancing 
American image abroad and beyond the Iron Curtain, Eisenhower often used 
the Monroe’s Motivated Sequence to structure his speeches. This technique 
for organising persuasive speeches that inspire people to take action was 
developed in the 1930s by political scientist Alan H. Monroe. The advantage 
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of it is that it creates an emotional link between the speaker and the audience 
by showing that the speaker understands the problem at hand and cares 
about solving it, and by making the audience involved as part of the solution 
by emphasising a call to action. It consists of five steps: 1) attention; 2) 
problem; 3) solution; 4) visualisation; 5) action (German, K., M., Gronbeck, B. 
E., Ehninger, D., Monroe, A. H. 2010). 
The best example of Eisenhower’s use of the Monroe Motivated Sequence is 
the Atoms for Peace speech. Delivered on 8 December, 1953 to the United 
Nations General Assembly, the speech, as Medhurst (1997) has argued, had 
several objectives. It was first of all a psychological warfare effort aimed at 
portraying the US as a peaceful nation willing to share its technological 
knowledge with the rest of the world and the Soviet Union as dangerously 
obsessed with nuclear war. It was also meant to contribute to the 
implementation of the administration’s New Look doctrine by diverting public 
attention from the on-going nuclear arms race and gaining access to foreign 
markets and raw material in exchange for US atomic energy assistance. The 
speech rhetorical strategy covered all three goals. 
Eisenhower’s opening line immediately grabbed the audience attention by 
stressing the significance of the occasion: 
 
“Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been 
gathered together into a single organisation” 
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He then clearly stated the problem at hands: atomic weapons had changed 
the nature of warfare and the Soviet Union had accumulated an increasingly 
dangerous number of them. 
 
“The new language is the language of atomic warfare….atomic bombs 
today are more than 25 times as powerful as the weapons with which the 
atomic age dawned, and hydrogen weapons are in ranges of millions of 
tons of TNT equivalent. The Soviet Union has informed us that, over 
recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons.” 
 
After successfully presenting Moscow as a threat to humanity, he offered the 
solution: 
 
“The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly  of 
the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such 
other countries as may be principally involved to seek an acceptable 
solution to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the 
peace, but the very life, of the world.” 
 
He elaborated on the proposed solution by reinforcing America’s image as a 
peace loving nation which could lead the world to a safe future and a safe use 
of atomic energy. 
 
“Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the “Great Destroyers” 
but the whole book of history reveals mankind’s never-ending quest for 
peace and mankind’s God-given capacity to build. It is the book of history, 
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and not the isolated pages, that he United States will ever wish to be 
identified. My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants 
agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants itself to live in freedom 
and in the confidence that the people of every other nation enjoy equally 
the right of choosing their own way of life. So my country’s purpose is to 
help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a 
way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men 
everywhere, can move forward toward peace and happiness and well 
being.” 
 
He concluded by invoking everybody’s help. The success of the 
plan/visualisation did not depend on the US only. But all nations, countries 
and citizens were called to play a role in the progress towards peace. 
 
“Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States 
does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the 
hope for peace. The coming months will be fraught with fateful 
decisions. In this Assembly; in the capitals and military headquarters; in 
the hearts of men every where, be they governors or governed, may the 
be the decisions which will lead this world out of the fear and into 
peace.” 
 
For the State of the Union Annual Message, Eisenhower abandoned the full 
Monroe’s Motivated Sequence and instead focused on steps two and three 
only: problem and solution. The President saw this message not as a general 
address that should be accessible in order to persuade as many people as 
possible. Rather, he reverted to his military background. The General (now 
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President) was telling his staff (now Congress) what needed to be done and 
how it needed to be done. For example, in the 1954 State of the Union, he 
identified the Communist threat as the main problem to American security: 
 
“American freedom is threatened so long as the world Communist 
conspiracy exists in its present scope, power and hostility.” 
(Eisenhower, 1954). 
 
He then offered the solution: 
 
“Our military power continues to grow. This power is for our own 
defence and to deter aggression. We shall not be aggressors, but we 
and our allies have and will maintain a massive capability to strike 
back.” (Eisenhower, 1954) 
 
He elaborated on the solution by presenting a “list of things to do”, i.e. what 
Congress should do to solve the problem. 
 
“At the foundation of our economic growth are the raw materials and 
energy produced from our materials and fuels, lands, forests, and 
water resources. With respect to them, I believe the nation must 
adhere to three fundamental policies: first, to develop, wisely use and 
conserve basic resources from generation to generation; second, to 
follow the historic pattern of developing these resources primarily by 
private citizens by fair provisions of law, including restraints for proper 
conservation; and third, to treat resource development as a partnership 
undertaking – a partnership in which the participation of private citizens 
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and State and local governments is as necessary as Federal 
participation.” (Eisenhower, 1954) 
 
Listing the necessary steps to solve the problems was a typical feature of 
Eisenhower’s State of the Union messages. During the eight years of the 
Presidency, every message contained at least 2 or 3 “lists.” These made the 
speeches quite lengthy and content dense, thus less accessible to the general 
public. The only exception was the State of the Union of 1958. The speech 
came just a few months after the launch of Sputnik. Eisenhower abandoned 
the problem/solution/list structure for the first half of the speech. Instead, he 
reverted to the Monroe Motivated Sequence to reassure the American people 
that the missile gap did not exist and that America was ready to face any 
forms of threat or danger. The second half of the speech went back to the 




The differentiation between audiences was also clear from the language used. 
Counting words, paragraphs, words per sentence and characters per word 
offers some insight into the complexity of Eisenhower’s rhetoric. The Flesch 
Reading Ease Index (FREI), a scale of 100 where the higher score, the easier 
to understand and the Flesch Kincaid Grade Level Test (FKGL), which rates 
comprehension in terms of US schools grades (so a score of 8.0 means an 
eight grader can understand the speech), can be used to indicate the level at 
which Eisenhower’s rhetoric was pitched so indicating its complexity. Table 1 
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clearly shows there is a striking distinction between his campaign and wider 
audience speeches and the State of the Union Messages. 
 


















I shall go to 
Korea 
57 50 61 31 9 3 15 4.4 66 8 
Convention 
52 
20 8 18 8 5 7 15 4.5 66 10 
Convention 
56 
91 29 45 60 26 20 19 4.3 66 9 
Inaugural ‘53 47 18 44 32 19 10 16 4.3 74.9 7 
Chance for 
Peace 
104 19 64 44 13 4 16 4.4 73.3 7 
Atoms for 
Peace 
75 7 36 36 18 18 21 4.6 60.0 10 
Farewell 33 12 27 21 8 8 25 5.2 35.91 14.6 
Inaugural ‘57 37 17 40 26 7 0 17 4.3 76.8 6.7 
State of the 
Union ‘53 
147 29 141 109 40 17 21 5.4 38 13.3 
State of the 
Union ‘54 
101 23 111 96 30 15 21 5.2 40.2 12.8 
State of the 
Union ‘55 
105 28 134 105 40 21 20 5.2 39.2 12.8 
State of the 
Union ‘56 
117 49 128 119 58 20 20 5 45.7 12 
State of the 
Union ‘57 
64 22 65 55 26 14 23 5.1 40.1 13.5 
State of the 
Union ‘58 
121 35 81 80 33 7 19/24 4.1/5.3 60.3/43.5 10/12 
State of the 
Union ‘59 
102 43 106 81 22 7 17 5.3 44.2 11.3 
State of the 
Union ‘60 
101 17 75 93 36 16 21 4.9 48 11.7 
Table 1 The sample is not exhaustive, but it is meant to represent the complexity of Eisenhower’s oratory. 
 
For speeches whose primary target was the general public the majority of 
sentences has less than 20 words and the average number of characters per 
word is 4.4, thus indicating simpler sentences and simpler messages. The 
Flesch Reading Ease Index and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Test confirm 
that these were quite accessible speeches to all, with the Inaugural of 1957 
being the easiest (76.8 – 6.7). 
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The exception is the Farewell Address. Eisenhower saw this speech as a 
unique rhetorical opportunity. In 1961, he was still an immensely popular 
figure and correctly realised that any thoughts he might express in his final 
message could have a deep impact on US political thinking. The speech had 
therefore several aims: 1) by voicing his concerns about the threat of the 
increasingly powerful defence establishment, he was fighting to keep a 
balance he thought was essential for proper government (Griffin, 1992); 2) He 
also wanted to strike a blow against those political enemies who had exploited 
the missile gap issue and against president-elect John F. Kennedy and his 
economic proposals; 3) finally, he wanted to give a remarkable farewell, like 
his hero, George Washington, to cement his historical legacy and ethos as a 
man of peace and above politics (Griffin, 1992 and Medhurst, 1994b). Such 
ambitious goals resulted in a sophisticated but less accessible speech. The 
average word number per sentence is 25, the average number of characters 
per word is 5.2., and the Flesch Ease Reading index and Flesch Kincaid 
Grade Level Test are respectively 35.9 and 14.6, thus making this the most 
difficult speech to understand among the sample analysed. 
On average sentences in the State of the Union Messages are longer, above 
20 words, the number of characters per word is higher 5.1 and the Flesch 
Reading Index and the Flesch Kincaid Grade Level test show these were less 
accessible and more difficult to understand. The Flesch Reading Index has 
dropped from an average 73 to 39.2 for the State of the Union of 1955 and 
Flesch Kincaid has increased from an average 7 to 12.8 for the State of the 
Union of 1954. The exception is again the State of the Union of 1958. As 
already mentioned, the speech was delivered a few months afterward Sputnik 
 27 
so the initial part of the speech is meant to reassure US citizens and goes 
back to less than 20 words per sentence and 4.1 characters per word with the 
Flesch Reading Index at 60.3 and the Flesch Kincaid at 10. The second half 
of the message was for Congress, so the number of words per sentence is 
back up to 24, the number of characters per word is 5.3 and the FREI and 
FKGLT are respectively 43.5 and 12. 
The differentiation among audiences was also clear from the choice of 
rhetorical devices. Despite his distaste for oratorical props, when he wanted to 
ensure his speech resonated with his audience, he turned to repetitions and 
metaphors.  
 
Speech Metaphors Alliteration Anaphora Antimetabole Hypophora Epinaphora Epistrophe Parachesis Parallelism 
I Shall go to 
Korea 
14 4 12 2 1 8 1 9 12 
Convention 
52 
12 6 5 5 0 3 5 1 9 
Convention 
56 
14 16 16 10 0 18 4 10 16 
Inaugural ‘53 24 19 19 3 1 11 1 7 22 
Chance for 
Peace 
14 24 20 1 2 11 12 7 23 
Atoms for 
Peace 
10 13 9 4 1 7 1 6 10 
Farewell 7 16 2 0 0 3 1 2 2 
Inaugural ‘57 24 17 14 2 0 4 2 2 11 
State of the 
Union ‘53 
2 2 6 0 0 1 0 1 3 
State of the 
Union ‘54 
1 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 
State of the 
Union ‘55 
1 3 12 0 0 2 1 1 3 
State of the 
Union ‘56 
1 2 8 1 0 2 1 2 3 
State of the 
Union ‘57 
4 8 5 0 0 3 1 2 5 
State of the 
Union ‘58 
7 8 9 1 1 5 4 5 6 
State of the 
Union ‘59 
3 2 6 0 1 2 0 3 2 
State of the 
Union ‘60 
2 4 1 0 0 2 0 2  2 




Table 2 shows a clear distinction in the use of rhetorical features between 
campaign speeches and addresses aimed at a wider audience and the annual 
messages to Congress. The exception being once again the Farewell 
Address. Eisenhower used no less than seven types of repetitions: alliteration, 
anaphora, antimetabole, epinaphora, epistrophe, parachises and parallelism. 
He used them to communicate a sense of conviction. As Chaeteris-Black 
argues “the more convinced a politician sounds about his or her own ideas 
and beliefs, the more convincing he or she is likely to be.” (2005:9-10).   By 
repeating certain words, sounds and sentence structures, he not only 
supported his argument (logos), but also aroused emotions (pathos) and 
reinforced his reputation and credibility (ethos) as a honest supporter of 
democracy. The extract below from a Chance for Peace (1953) best illustrates 
the President’s use of these rhetorical devices. 
 
We are ready, in short, to dedicate our strength to serving the needs, 
rather than the fears, of the world. 
We are ready, by these and all such actions, to make of the United 
Nations an institution that can effectively guard the peace and security 
of all peoples. 
I know of nothing I can add to make plainer the sincere purpose of the 
United States. 
I know of no course, other than that marked by these and similar 
actions, that can be called the highway of peace. 
I know of only one question upon which progress waits. It is this: 
What is the Soviet Union ready to do? 
Whatever the answer be, let it be plainly spoken. 
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Again we say: the hunger for peace is too great, the hour in history too 
late, for any government to mock men’s hopes with mere words and 
promises and gestures. 
The test of truth is simple. There can be no persuasion but by deeds. 
Is the new leadership of the Soviet Union prepared to use its decisive 
influence in the Communist world, including control of the flow of arms, 
to bring not merely an expedient truce in Korea but genuine peace in 
Asia? 
Is it prepared to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, 
the free choice of their own forms of government? 
Is it prepared to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament 
proposals to be made firmly effective by stringent U.N. control and 
inspection? 
If not, where then is the concrete evidence of the Soviet Union’s concern 
for peace? 
 
By repeating “We are ready” (anaphora), he tapped on Americans’ feelings of 
patriotism and unity in supporting the cause for peace. But he also presented 
himself as “one of them” as in we are all in this together and we need to work 
together to succeed in protecting peace. He then used his ethos to challenge 
the Soviet Union by repeating “I know of.” Eisenhower, a man of peace, had 
tried everything possible to advance the cause of peace, now it was up to 
Moscow to show if it could live up to international moral standards. This 
implied that if peace was not achieved than it was Russia’s fault. He 
concluded the passage with a series of rhetorical questions (hypophora) to 
reinforce the massage and put the Soviet Union on the spot. 
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The passage is enriched by the use of metaphors. Eisenhower used 
metaphors mainly to simplify complicated political ideas. This is why he used 
them mostly in speeches aimed at wider audiences. By explaining abstract 
political issues through image based metaphors, he made them more 
intelligible and accessible. Using shared mental representations also 
contributed to the impression that he was telling the right story (Van Dijk, 
1995) and therefore established him as a legitimate source of authority by 
“sounding right” (Chilton, 2004, p.47). Finally, metaphors allowed him to reach 
multiple audiences at the same times. Since metaphors are not precise the 
listener can give their own interpretation to it.  
Eisenhower used a wide range of metaphors. He used single-word 
metaphors such as the “the price of Liberty” or “the hunger for peace” 
(Chance for Peace, 1953). He often used simile to put effort on context, “In 
the final place a soldier’s pack is not so heavy as a burden on a prisoner’s 
chains” (Inaugural, 1953). He also drew up extended images as when 
discussing  the events in Hungary during his 1957 Inaugural Address: 
 
“Through the night of their bondage, the unconquerable will of 
heroes has struck with the swift, sharp thrust of lighting. Budapest is 
no longer merely the name of a city; henceforth it is a new and 
shining symbol of men’s yearning to be free.” 
 
His metaphors/images most of all featured the idea of light against darkness, 
such as: 
 




“so my country’s purpose is to help us move out of the dark chambers of 
horror into the light”  
(Atoms for Peace, 1953) 
 
Poetry, Wit & Anecdotes 
Eisenhower rarely used poetry in his speeches and he certainly never used 
wit. On occasions, he would use anecdotes. For example, in the introduction 
of Atoms for Peace, he recalled the Bermuda meeting. He also occasionally 
used references to US history and quotes from past presidents he admired. 
For example, in the State of the Union of 1957, he declared “In the main, 
today’s expressions of nationalism are, in spirit, echoes of our forefathers’s 
struggle for independence” when referring to the tide of nationalism sweeping 
the world in 1956.  And in the State of the Union of 1958,  he quoted President 
McKinley in order to rally support for the US role in the word, “As President 
McKinley said, as long ago as 1901: Isolationism is no longer possible or 
desirable….the period of exclusiveness  is past.”  
 
DELIVERY 
Reading Eisenhower’s speeches and listening or watching him delivering them 
are two very different experiences. Unfortunately, there are not many audio 
and video recordings left compared to other figures examined in this volume. 
But Eisenhower was not a natural orator and the delivery did not reflect the 
sophistication of the rhetorical strategy. Many of the rhetorical devices and 
their effectiveness were lost once the words were pronounced. Eisenhower 
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read from a script and this constrained him. Since he had to focus on the 
written words, he would often lose that warm smile that characterised his 
public image. He was at his best as an orator when he could talk 
extemporaneously. Following a script made him often stutter thus breaking the 
natural flow of the speech. The other problem in reading from a script was that 
he had to wear glasses which in the early years of his administration were 
black rimmed and casted a shadow over his blue eyes making it more difficult 
to make eye contact with the audience. 
Eisenhower was aware of this. In an attempt to improve his delivery skills, he 
hired Hollywood actor Robert Montgomery who immediately replaced the black 
glasses with a shell-rim pair. He also tried to coach Eisenhower in using a 
teleprompter thus abandoning the written text. These changes combined with 
a full revamp of the President’s wardrobe slightly improved the end result but 




Eisenhower was a better speechwriter than orator. This does not mean 
however that his message was not effective or persuasive. On the contrary, if 
one looks at Eisenhower’s rhetoric and oratory through the lenses of 
Aristotle’s classic definition (1991), the Ike comes out as a very successful 
communicator. Aristotle argued that effective rhetoric did not depend on the 
style of oratorical choices used by the speaker. Rather rhetoric as an art 
focused on planning, organisation, selection and purpose. Examining 
Eisenhower’s speeches clearly shows that this definition shaped every aspect 
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of the President’s rhetorical strategy. This strategy was one of the most 
important elements of his leadership style. 
As he often declared in his speeches, for Ike, leading meant leading by 
example. Through a skilful use of ethos, pathos and logos, he was able to 
project a dual image of himself as an exceptional leader and as a man of the 
people, thus inspiring his fellow Americans to support him, his vision and his 
policies. To judge him on the basis of his often stuttering and script 
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